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This paper introduces anewmathematical object: the confidence structure. A confidence
structure represents inferential uncertainty in an unknown parameter by defining a be-
lief function whose output is commensurate with Neyman–Pearson confidence. Confidence
structures on a group of input variables can be propagated through a function to obtain a
valid confidence structure on the output of that function. The theory of confidence structures
is created by enhancing the extant theory of confidence distributionswith themathematical
generality of Dempster–Shafer evidence theory. Mathematical proofs grounded in random
set theory demonstrate the operative properties of confidence structures. The result is a
new theory which achieves the holistic goals of Bayesian inference while maintaining the
empirical rigor of frequentist inference.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Thepurpose of the theory of confidence structures is to provide adequatemathematical support for engineers and applied
scientists whomust quantify and propagate inferential uncertainty. For example, consider an engineer analyzing a proposed
aircraft design. To assess the aerodynamics of the airframe, this engineer will likely use wind tunnel data, which will be
subject to random errors. These random errors will cause inferential uncertainty in the experimentally based estimates of
aerodynamic parameters such as the lift-curve slope or the stall angle of attack. The question addressed in this paper is how
that inferential uncertainty can be usefully quantified.
Two basic requirements pervade uncertainty quantification problems in engineering: first, that uncertainty be repre-
sented in a comprehensive fashion; second, that uncertainty be expressed inmeaningful (i.e., objective) terms. For example,
the aerospace design engineer will need to propagate uncertainty about the aerodynamics of an aircraft together with un-
certainties about the structure and control systems to determine how much belief is justified in the proposition that the
proposed design will function as required. This engineer is not interested in determining which of two hypothetical values
of the lift coefficient is better supported by the wind tunnel data. What he or she needs is a distribution of rational belief
over the continuum of possible lift coefficient values. Moreover, to phrase these uncertainties in subjective terms, such as
the personal betting preferences of the contributing experimenters, is an untenable strategy. The design engineer is unlikely
to know these experimenters well enough to interpret their subjective uncertainty assessments correctly. It is more useful
to constrain uncertainty analysis to the same standards of rigor to which deterministic analysis in science and engineering
is held, namely that analyses be phrased only in terms of falsifiable claims. What engineers require is a theory of statistical
inference that supports a representation of inferential uncertainty that is both empirically rigorous and comprehensive in
its nature.
The two schools of statistical inference dominant today each address only one of these needs. Bayesian inference rep-
resents inferential uncertainty using posterior distributions that can be readily propagated as part of a larger uncertainty
∗ Tel.: +1 540 357 0324.
E-mail address:mbalch@vt.edu (M.S. Balch).
0888-613X/$ - see front matter © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2012.05.006
1004 M.S. Balch / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 53 (2012) 1003–1019
quantification effort. This is a comprehensive representation of uncertainty, but Bayesian measures of belief rarely admit an
interpretation that could be considered rigorous by scientific standards [1, Chap. 2–3] [2, Chap. 3] [3, Chap. 5]. The claims
supported by frequentistmethods of hypothesis testing can be interpreted objectively in terms of outcomes in large numbers
of repeated trials [4, Chap. 1] [5, Chap. 1]. This is ameaningful way to express uncertainty, but it is difficult, if not impossible,
to propagate the outcome of a single hypothesis test with other uncertainty sources. What is needed, and what this paper
seeks to provide, is a theory that combines the best elements of frequentist and Bayesian methods.
The theory of confidence distributions is amiddle-of-the-road approach to statistical inference. A confidence distribution
represents inferential uncertainty about a parameter by representing that parameter mathematically as a random variable.
A confidence distribution is a holistic representation of inferential uncertainty, much like a Bayesian posterior. What confi-
dence distributions lack as holistic representations of uncertainty, however, is a theoretical justification for their propagation
in uncertainty analysis. In fact, the propagation of confidence distributions has been explicitly discouraged [5, Chap. 5]. Confi-
dence distributions also admit a rigorous frequentist interpretation; the belief values supported by a confidence distribution
are commensurate with Neyman–Pearson confidence. However, valid confidence distributions supporting this interpreta-
tion can only be derived for a limited class of problems. For example, no valid confidence distribution can be defined for a
continuous parameter that is inferred from a discrete observable [6]. The solution that currently prevails in the confidence
distribution community is to define an asymptotic confidence distribution. Asymptotic confidence distributions do not ac-
tually support a confidence interpretation but come arbitrarily close to doing so with large numbers of observations [7]. The
advantage of this approach is that it keeps the representation of inferential uncertainty within the familiar mathematical
framework of probability theory. However, the promise of asymptotic convergencemay be of little value to applied scientists
and engineers forced to work with data sets of limited size.
In the theory of confidence structures, a different approach is taken. The rigorous Neyman–Pearson confidence interpre-
tation is maintained at the expense of mathematical familiarity. Confidence structures generalize confidence distributions
by allowing inferential uncertainty to be represented by random sets, which generalize random variables. This is the same
strategy bywhich Dempster–Shafer evidence theory generalizes the Bayesian formalism [8,9]. In fact, themathematical for-
malism used in this paper draws much inspiration from a recent paper by Dempster [10]. Readers unfamiliar with random
sets or confidence distributions will find the necessary material covered in this paper in Sections 2.2 and 3.1 respectively.
The purpose of this paper is to introduce the concept of a confidence structure, to establish an initial set of methods for
constructing confidence structures, and to prove that confidence structures can be legitimately propagated. Section 2 gives
a formal mathematical definition for confidence structures. Section 3 discusses some methods for constructing confidence
structures. Section 4 states and proves the Confidence-Mapping Lemma. This lemma is used to prove a number of major
and minor theorems in Sections 4 and 5. Section 5 discusses the propagation of confidence structures. That independent
confidence structures can be propagated using a Cartesian product formulation is posited as a theorem and then proved.
Section 6 discusses the difficulties with non-uniqueness that arise in the theory of confidence structures. Section 7 explores
the relationships between confidence structures and other methods of statistical inference. The paper concludes in Section
8 with some comments on the promise and potential pitfalls of the theory of confidence structures.
2. Mathematical groundwork and definitions
2.1. The problem of statistical inference
Statistical inference starts with a statistical model. A statistical model is an assumed relationship between an observable
random variable, x, and an underlying parameter, θ , whose unknown value determines the probability distribution of x. In
formal terms, a statistical model, Sx,θ , is defined as the following quartet of components:
Sx,θ ≡ (x, Bx, θ , Prox|θ ) ,
where x is the set of possible values of x; Bx is a Borel algebra of subsets of x; θ is the set of possible values of θ ;
and Prox|θ : Bx → [0, 1] denotes a family of probability functions, each possible value of θ defining a member of that
family. A probability function is mathematically defined as a function that satisfies the Kolmogorov axioms [11, Chap. 1].
Under a frequentist view, the term probability is restricted to refer to frequency of occurrence in similar situations, and the
Kolmogorov axioms follow as a natural consequence of this definition [4, Chap. 3] [12, Chap. 1].1
The statistical inference problem addressed in this paper is to determine how a realized value of x induces a distribution
of rational belief on possible values of θ . More formally, the goal is to define a function
Belθ |x : Bθ → [0, 1] ,
that returns the level of belief in the hypothesis “θ ∈ B” that is rationally justified given an observed x. The belief function
must return a value for every B ∈ Bθ , where Bθ is some Borel-field of possible sets in which θ could fall. Since Borel algebras
1 The Kolmogorov axioms follow when a finite number of similar situations is considered; but, if the limit frequency over an infinite number of situations is
considered, matters become more complicated [12, Chap. 1].
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are complicated, it is impractical to directly define a belief function. Rather, amathematical object such as a randomnumber,
fuzzy number, or random set is necessary to support a belief function.
2.2. Random set theory
A random set on a variable y consists of an auxiliary random seed-variable, a, with a fixed probability distribution and a
map from individual values of a to subsets of the space in which y falls. A random set,Ry,a, can be defined as the following
sextet of components:
Ry,a = (a, Ba, Proa, y, By, Y) ,
where a is the space of all possible values of a; Ba is a Borel algebra of sets in which a could fall; Proa : Ba → [0, 1] is the
probability function for a;y is the space of all possible values of y;By is the Borel algebra of interest for Y ; and Y : a → By
is the map from the random seed-variable to sets of possible y-values [13, Chap. 1]. The belief function for y is computed in
terms of the probability function on the auxiliary random seed variable, a, using the following formula:
Bely (B) = Proa ({a ∈ a : Y (a) ⊆ B}) ∀B ∈ By. (1)
It is also useful to define aplausibility function to complement the belief function. InDempster–Shafer theory, the plausibility
function is defined by the following formula:
Plsy (B) = 1 − Bely (Bc) ∀B ∈ By,
where Bc is the set complement of B [14]. From this definition, it is possible to derive the following formula for calculating
plausibility:
Plsy (B) = Proa ({a ∈ a : Y (a) ∩ B = ∅}) ∀B ∈ By. (2)
Plausibility is the extent to which the evidence does not indicate that “y ∈ B” is false. The plausibility left to a set will always
be greater than or equal to the belief accorded to it.
Three random sets are illustrated in Fig. 1. Each of the random sets illustrated in Fig. 1 uses a uniform random variable
on the unit interval as its random seed-variable. The process for calculating belief and plausibility values defined by Eqs. (1)
and (2) are visualized for these same random sets in Figs. 2 and 3.
The theory of random sets is notable for supporting randomvariables and fuzzy variables as special cases.When the belief
and plausibility functions for a random set are equal, that random set is a random variable, and its belief and plausibility
functions qualifymathematically as aprobability function. That condition is equivalent to themap function alwaysproducing
single points as its output [13, Chap. 1] [15, Chap. 3]. For example, Panel A of Figs. 1–3 illustrates a random variable. When
a random set can be written using a uniform random seed-variable on the unit interval while satisfying the following
relationship:
Y (a2) ⊆ Y (a1) ∀a1, a2 ∈ [0, 1] s.t. a1 ≤ a2,
that random-set is consonant. The belief and plausibility functions of a consonant random set satisfy the same axioms as
the necessity and possibility functions of a fuzzy variable; in fact, all fuzzy variables can be written as consonant random
sets [15, Chap. 3]. (There are, however, certain consonant random sets that do not meet Zadeh’s original definition [16] for a
fuzzy variable.) Panel C of Figs. 1–3 illustrates a fuzzy variable.
It is important to note that the belief and plausibility functions for a random set, as defined in Eqs. (1) and (2), are
well-posed if and only if
{a ∈ a : Y (a) ⊆ B} ∈ Ba ∀B ∈ By and Y (a) = ∅ ∀a ∈ a.
For most of this paper, the well-posedness of a given random set is taken for granted. However, that is not to say the matter
can be perpetually dismissed in the future.
Fig. 1. Some random sets with a uniformly distributed auxiliary seed variable.
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Fig. 2. The graphical calculation of belief on set S.
Fig. 3. The graphical calculation of plausibility on set S.
2.3. Conservatism in uncertainty quantification
At several points throughout this paper, statements are made regarding the relative conservatism of different repre-
sentations of uncertainty. This is a formalization of the concept of conservatism already in use in engineering analysis. In
engineering analysis, Estimate A is more conservative than Estimate B if an analysis using Estimate A is less favorable to the
proposed system than the analysis obtained using Estimate B. That is, conservatism is the reluctance to assign belief to the
proposition that the mission or proposed system design will be a success. As a rule, conservatism is considered a healthy
bias, since it will drive engineers to design safer systems.
At the start of an uncertainty analysis, itmay be impossible to tell which values of an uncertain parameter aremore or less
favorable to a proposed system or mission. However, within the theory of random sets, it is possible for one representation
of uncertainty to be universally more conservative than another. Assuming thatRy1,a andRy2,a represent uncertainty in the
same quantity,Ry1,a is conservative with respect toRy2,a if and only if
Bely1 (A) ≤ Bely2 (A) ∀A ∈ By. (3)
This is the formal definition exclusively associated with the word “conservative” throughout the remainder of this paper.
Also, it may be worthwhile to note that “conservatism” as defined in this paper is equivalent to the concept of “inclusion”
defined by Dubois and Prade in their work [17].
2.4. Observation-conditional random sets
The theory of confidence structures concerns a class of mathematical objects labeled in this paper as conditional random
sets. Confidence structures are observation-conditional random sets on the parameter(s) defined in a statistical model.
However, not all observation-conditional randomsetsare confidencestructures.What sets a confidencestructureapart is that
its belief function is commensurate with Neyman–Pearson confidence, like the belief function of a confidence distribution.
This section establishes these definitions in formal mathematical terms in order to support the theoretical developments in
Sections 4 and 5.
An observation-conditional random set on θ is a conditional random set whose map, , depends on the observed value
of the observable random variable, x. An observation-conditional random set is defined as follows:
Rθ,a|x = (a, Ba, Proa, θ , Bθ , x, Bx, ) ,
where a,a, Ba, Proa,θ ,x , Bx , and Bθ have the samemeanings assigned in Sections 2.1 and 2.2; and : a × x → Bθ
serves as the map from a to θ for any given observed value of x. As the name suggests, the belief function of an observation-
conditional random set is contingent upon observation. Given a specific observation, x, the belief function is calculated as
follows:
Belθ |x (A) = Proa ({a ∈ a : (a, x) ⊆ A}) ∀x ∈ x, A ∈ Bθ .
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The plausibility function can be calculated as
Plsθ |x (A) = Proa ({a ∈ a : (a, x) ∩ A = ∅}) ∀x ∈ x, A ∈ Bθ .
One may also define, for any observation-conditional random set on a parameter, an induced parameter-conditional
random set on the observable variable, x. For the purposes of this paper, this random set is labeled the “induced auxiliary
formulation” for x. The map for this induced auxiliary formulation is as follows:
X (a, θ) = {x ∈ x : θ ∈ (a, x)} . (4)
The induced auxiliary formulation for the observable proves to be of immense theoretical import in the proofs about confi-
dence structures presented in Sections 4 and 5. Specifically, the Confidence-Mapping Lemma concerns whether or not the
induced parameter-conditional random set is conservative with respect to the probability function for the observable.
The following restrictions on observation-conditional random sets are, at present, theoretically necessary:
{a ∈ a : (a, x) ⊆ C} ∈ Ba ∀C ∈ Bθ , x ∈ x,
{a ∈ a : X (a, θ) ⊆ S} ∈ Ba ∀S ∈ Wx, θ ∈ θ,
Wx ⊆ Bx,
where
Wx =
⎧⎨
⎩S ⊆ x : ∃θ ∈ θ, A ∈ Ba s.t. S =
⎧⎨
⎩x ∈ x : θ ∈
⋃
a∈A
(a, x)
⎫⎬
⎭
⎫⎬
⎭ .
Whether these restrictions are of practical import is not certain. It seems that they should not be; they are introducedmerely
to ensure that the probability and belief values involved in the proofs of Sections 4 and 5 are well-posed. The concern is that,
strictly speaking, a probability function or belief function must have a specified Borel algebra as its domain [11, ch. 1].
The restrictions stipulated above ensure that all of the sets involved in the proof of the Confidence-Mapping Lemma are
contained within the Borel algebras defined in the construction of any given confidence structure. In the future, it should
be possible to minimally extend the domain of a probability function to include certain sets that are not part of the Borel
algebra on which said probability function was initially defined. Until then, these restrictions are necessary in order to keep
the theoretical developments of this paper within the mathematical strictures of proper measure theory.
2.5. Neyman–Pearson confidence and confidence sets
Confidence sets andNeyman–Pearson confidenceare central concepts in the theoryof confidence structures. A confidence
set is a set-estimator for a parameter. It is a function of the observable, C : x → Bθ , designed to cover the true parameter
value with a specified regularity. The confidence interval is the most well-known type of confidence set. The Neyman–
Pearson confidence associated with a confidence set is the frequentist probability of drawing x such that C (x) covers the
true parameter value. This is also known as the coverage probability of C (x). The performance of a confidence set can be
tested experimentally. For example, over a large number of repeated draws of x, a 95% confidence interval based on x will
cover the true value of θ in roughly 95% of those draws. (Since the true parameter value is unknown, a confidence set must
exhibit this performance for all possible values of the parameter to be considered a legitimate confidence set.) It is because
of this validatability that Neyman–Pearson confidence is accepted in this paper as a rigorous representation of inferential
uncertainty.
2.6. Confidence structure
A confidence structure is an observation-conditional random set whose belief values are commensurate with Neyman–
Pearson confidence. That is, the map for a confidence structure satisfies the following condition:
Prox|θ
⎛
⎝
⎧⎨
⎩x ∈ x : θ ∈
⋃
a∈A
(a, x)
⎫⎬
⎭
⎞
⎠ ≥ Proa (A) ∀A ∈ Ba, θ ∈ θ .
Phrased differently, a confidence structure is a cipher for constructing confidence sets of the following form:
C (A; x) = ⋃
a∈A
(a, x), A ∈ Ba,
where the coverage probability of C (A; x) is greater than or equal to the auxiliary probability, Proa (A). Since for every set,
B ∈ Bθ , and possible observation, x ∈ x , there is some set, A ∈ Ba, such that B = C (A; x); every set in Bθ is, in effect, a
confidence set for θ . So, when assessing a set B ∈ Bθ the question is notwhether or not it is a confidence set. It is a confidence
set. The question is how much confidence is associated with that set. The belief function of a confidence structure answers
that question. That is, the belief function of a confidence structure returns a lower bound on the coverage probability of the
confidence set associated with a fixed set B ∈ Bθ for a given observation.
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3. Methods for constructing confidence structures
3.1. Confidence distributions
As probability theory can be considered a special case of random set theory [15, Chap. 3], confidence distributions are
a special case of confidence structures. However, the presentation usually associated with confidence distributions differs
from the definition established in Section 2.6. The central object of a traditional confidence distribution is a cumulative
confidence function [6,7]. Within the framework established in this paper, the cumulative confidence function, H (θ, x),
would be defined as follows:
H (θ, x) = Belθ |x ((−∞, θ ]) ∀θ ∈ .
A cumulative confidence function can only be defined when θ is a single real-valued parameter; so, most work with con-
fidence distributions has been narrowly focused on single-parameter problems [6,7]. No such restriction exists within the
framework used in this paper; a confidence distribution is any confidence structure whose belief function satisfies the
Kolmogorov axioms.
That being said, work based on the cumulative confidence formulation has produced a small but respectable body of
methods for constructingconfidencedistributions. Thebest-knownanalyticalmethod forproducingconfidencedistributions
involves the use of pivots. A pivot is a function of both the parameters and the observable that has the same distribution for
all values of the parameters [5, Chap. 2] [11, Chap. 9]. The t-statistic is one of the most well-known pivots. Given a sample,
x, of size n drawn from a normal population with mean μ and standard deviation σ , the t-statistic is defined as
T (x, μ) = x¯ − μ
sx/
√
n
,
where x¯ is the sample mean and sx is the sample standard deviation. No matter what the value of μ and σ , T will have a
t-distribution with n − 1 degrees of freedom. The cumulative confidence function for μ can be defined as follows:
Fig. 4. Illustration of confidence-mapping using a t-distribution. Each frame illustrates the confidence structure associated with a different realized observation.
The axes labels in the first frame apply to all frames. The second frame illustrates the locations of A and C [A; x].
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H (μ, x) = Ftn−1
(
μ − x¯
sx/
√
n
)
,
where Ftn−1 is the cumulative distribution function for a t-distribution with n − 1 degrees of freedom. The confidence
distribution with this cumulative confidence function can be expressed using the following map:
M (a, x) = inf {μ ∈  : H (μ, x) ≥ a} ∀a ∈ [0, 1] , x ∈ n,
where the auxiliary random seed-variable is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. (Here, the letterM is used for themap, since the
parameter being inferred is μ.) Fig. 4 illustrates this confidence distribution for twelve independent realizations of x. (For
this example, n = 5.) The confidence-mapping property described in Section 2.6 is illustrated for A = [0.4, 0.8]. Since a is
uniformly distributed, it is expected that C [A; x] will cover the true mean,μ0, in 40% of any large collection of independent
realizations of x. In five out of the twelve panels in Fig. 4, C [A; x] covers μ0; this realized success rate is close to the limit
value of 40%.
3.2. Confidence structures via pivots
Pivot-basedmethodscanbeextendedtosupport confidencestructures for certainproblemswithdiscreteobservables. The
method is called pivoting the cumulative distribution function [11, Chap. 9]. (This method is called pivoting the distribution
because, for continuous observables, the value of FT (T (x, θ) |θ)will be uniformly distributed for all values of θ . That is, the
cumulative distribution function of the statistic is itself a pivot. The confidence interval procedure defined below is simply an
extension of the formula for pivot-based confidence intervals for continuous observables to discrete observables, although,
strictly speaking no exact pivot is involved in the formulation for discrete observables.) It can only be appliedwhen a statistic,
T (x, θ), can be defined such that its cumulative distribution, FT (t|θ), is a monotonic increasing or monotonic decreasing
as of θ , for a given fixed value of the statistic, t. From this statistic, a family of confidence intervals can be defined. If FT is
decreasing in θ , an α2 − α1 confidence interval, [θL (t) , θU (t)], on θ is as follows:
ProT|θU(t) ({T : T ≤ t}) = α1 and ProT|θL(t) ({T : T ≥ t}) = α2.
If FT is increasing in θ , then
ProT|θL(t) ({T : T ≤ t}) = α1 and ProT|θU(t) ({T : T ≥ t}) = α2.
Casella and Berger provide proof for the validity of such confidence intervals [11, Chap. 9]. This family of pivot-based confi-
dence intervals leads readily to the following pivot-based definition for a confidence structure:
(a, t) = {θ ∈ θ : ProT|θ ({T : T < t}) ≤ a ≤ ProT|θ ({T : T ≤ t})} .
For example, thismethod can be used to construct a pivot-based confidence structure for the binomial inference problem.
The number of successes, k, in n independent trials is a sufficient statistic whose cumulative distribution function can be
pivoted to support a confidence structure. The map for this confidence structure will be as follows:
(a, k) =
⎧⎨
⎩θ ∈ θ :
k−1∑
x=0
θ x (1 − θ)n−x
(
n
x
)
≤ a ≤
k∑
x=0
θ x (1 − θ)n−x
(
n
x
)⎫⎬
⎭ ,
where θ is the unknown underlying probability of success in any one given trial.
Fig. 5 illustrates the pivot-based confidence structures obtained from twelve randomly selected outcomes of a binomial
process with n = 7 and θ0 = 0.7. Fig. 5 also illustrates the mapping of a 40% confidence interval. This confidence interval
covered the true value of θ0 in seven out of the twelve trials, a somewhat higher rate than the promised coverage level of
40%. This could be dismissed as due to randomness in the sampling process, but there is an actual discrepancy between
the promised coverage rate of 40% and the coverage rate that would be achieved in a large number of trials. The confidence
interval built by mapping the interval a ∈ [0.4, 0.8] through the confidence structure will cover θ0 = 0.7 if k = 4 or
k = 5. Given θ0 = 0.7, the probability of seeing four or five successes in seven independent trials is roughly 54%. So, the
coverage probability is actually better than promised; that is, the confidence structure is conservative. This is often the case
for non-distributional confidence structures.
While pivots enable the construction of confidence structures for one-parameter inference problems with discrete ob-
servables, they are, in general, of limited utility. It is often the case in statistical inference problems that no useful pivot can
be defined. For this reason, additional means for deriving confidence structures are necessary.
3.3. Consonant confidence structures via p-values
While known pivots may be relatively rare, test-statistics are generally easy to construct. In broad terms, a test-statistic is
a real-valued statistic that rates howwell the observation, x, conforms to a given hypothesis,H, about the parameter, θ . Given
a test-statistic and an observation, it is possible to calculate the p-value of said hypothesis. The p-value of the hypothesis
is the probability of the test-statistic yielding a score under a future observation that is worse (i.e., less conformable to the
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Fig. 5. Pivot-based confidence structure for binomial parameter. Each frame illustrates the confidence structure associated with a different realized observation.
The axes labels in the first frame apply to all frames. The second frame illustrates the locations of A and C [A; x].
hypothesis) than the one obtained using the present observation, given the assumption that the hypothesis is true [11, Chap.
8]. If a p-value is low, it reflects that either the observation was a fluke or the hypothesis is not true [1, Chap. 2] [5, Chap. 3].
Hence, although the “p” in p-value traditionally stands for probability, it would be more useful for the reader to think of it
as signifying plausibility or possibility, because that is what a p-value ultimately reflects.
Given a reasonable goodness-of-fit statistic, it is possible to construct a confidence structure using the distribution of
p-values over the space of possible parameter values, θ . Let r (θ |x) : θ → [0, 1] be a function returning the p-value of
the hypothesis that θ is the true parameter value given observation, x. This function can be used to construct confidence
intervals of the following form:
{θ ∈ θ : r (θ |x) ≥ α} ,
where α ∈ [0, 1] and 1 − α is the level of confidence associated with this interval estimator [11, Chap. 9]. This form of
confidence interval readily suggests a confidence structure with the following map:
(a, x) = {θ ∈ θ : r (θ |x) ≥ a} ∀a ∈ [0, 1] , x ∈ x,
where a is uniformly distributed on the unit interval. This confidence structure will necessarily be consonant because, for all
a1, a2 ∈ [0, 1] such that a1 ≤ a2, r (θ |x) ≥ a2 implies r (θ |x) ≥ a1 andhence(a2, x) ⊂ (a1, x). There is an impediment
to this method of constructing confidence structures; for this method to support a well-posed confidence structure, there
must be some parameter value, θ ∈ θ , for which r (θ |x) = 1. Otherwise, there will be some a for which (a, x) = ∅.
It is not difficult to prove that the belief values from structures built using p-values have a Neyman–Pearson confidence
interpretation. Because the structure is consonant, all nominally 1− a0 confidence sets computable from this structure will
contain the following set:⋃
a≥a0
(a, x) = {θ ∈ θ : r (θ |x) ≥ a0} , (5)
which Casella and Berger have established is a valid confidence set of level 1 − a0 [11, Chap. 9]. Any set, B ∈ Bθ that does
not contain a set of the form (a0, x) where a0 ∈ [0, 1] will yield a belief value of zero. Consonant confidence structures
derived using p-values are thus guaranteed to be conservative.
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To give an example, it is possible to use the p-value approach to define a confidence structure for the slope in a classic
linear regression problem, in which it is assumed that an observed dependent variable, y, is the sum of a linear function of
an observed (non-random) independent variable x and some random unbiased experimental error. This relationship can be
expressed as yij = α + βxi + ij where the random errors, ij , are assumed to be iid and normally distributed with zero
mean and unknown variance. The goal of the linear regression problem is to determine the unknown true slope value, β
and unknown intercept value, α. One measure of fit between the data and a pair of hypothetical values for α and β is the
sum of the square residuals:
R2 (α, β) =
k∑
i=1
ni (y¯i − βxi − α)2,
where ni is the number of y-measurements at xi, y¯i is the sample-mean of the y-measurements at xi, and k is the number of
distinct x-values at which measurements were made. R2 (α, β) is minimized by the following estimates of α and β:
βˆ =
∑k
i=1
(
y¯i − ¯¯y
) (
xi − ¯¯x
)
∑k
i=1 ni
(
xi − ¯¯x
)2 and αˆ = ¯¯y − βˆ ¯¯x where ¯¯y =
∑k
i=1 niy¯i∑k
i=1 ni
and ¯¯x =
∑k
i=1 nixi∑k
i=1 ni
.
It makes some sense to normalize the sum of the square residuals by itsminimumpossible value; this normalization reflects
the assumption that there is some slope-intercept pair for which yij = α + βxi + ij . This normalization leads to residual
ratio as the following test statistic:
T (α, β) = R
2
(
αˆ, βˆ
)
R2 (α, β)
.
For this test statistic, large values of T are defined to be better (more favorable to the hypothesized slope-intercept values)
than smaller values of T . As it turns out, for a fixed given number of x-points, k, this ratio has a known distribution which is
Fig. 6. Consonant confidence structure on slope of linear x-y relationship. Each frame illustrates the confidence structure associated with a different realized
observation. The axes labels in the first frame apply to all frames. The second frame illustrates the locations of A and C [A; x].
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independent of the variance of the errors; it is beta-distributed with parameters k−2
2
and 1. So, it is fairly easy in this classic
regression problem to define a joint consonant confidence structure for α and β .
To give amore easily visualizable result, Fig. 6 illustrates the consonant confidence structure obtained for the slope alone.
Here, the following adjusted residual ratio is used:
T ′ (β) = R
2
(
αˆ, βˆ
)
R2 (α′, β)
,
where α′ is the residual-minimizing intercept-value for a fixed value of β . The result that Fig. 6 illustrates is for k = 4.
At k = 4, the cumulative distribution function for T ′ (β) is equal to 1 − √1 − t. So, for each sample of y-values, T ′ is
calculated, and thep-value is thengivenas1−√1 − T ′. The resultingpossibilitydistribution supports a confidence structure.
Fig. 6 illustrates that in twelve trials, a nominally 40% confidence interval generated from this consonant confidence structure
covers the true slope-value in five trials.
4. The Confidence-Mapping Lemma
The reader may have noticed that no proof for the validity of pivot-based confidence structures was given or referenced
in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Proofs establishing validity of pivot-based confidence intervals were referenced, but a confidence
structure maps all of the sets in a defined auxiliary Borel algebra, Ba, not just the intervals. In the case where a is uniformly
distributed on [0, 1], that means that confidence sets based on unions of sub-intervals of [0, 1] must also be valid. Rather
than track down and prove the validity of all confidence sets type-by-type, it would be helpful for the applied statistician if
there were a theoretical tool that could be used to simultaneously establish the validity of all confidence sets supported by
a given confidence structure. This is the purpose of the Confidence-Mapping Lemma.
In addition to supporting proof of the validity of pivot-based confidence structures, the Confidence-Mapping Lemma
has other uses. It is a key step in proving that independent confidence structures can be propagated (see Section 5). It also
suggests a link between the theory of confidence structures and the Dempster–Shafer calculus posited in Dempster’s 2008
paper [10], as is explored briefly in Section 7. Given these multiple uses, it is prudent to single out the Confidence-Mapping
Lemma and its proof for exposition, in case it may be used in future unforeseen proofs about confidence structures.
The Confidence-Mapping Lemma states that an observation-conditional random set, Rθ,a|x , is a confidence structure if
and only if the auxiliary formulation (see Eq. (4)) it induces on x has a belief function that is conservative with respect to
the actual probability distribution of x for all values of θ . That is,
Proa (A) ≤ Prox|θ
⎛
⎝
⎧⎨
⎩x ∈ x : θ ∈
⋃
a∈A
(a, x)
⎫⎬
⎭
⎞
⎠ ∀A ∈ Ba, θ ∈ θ
if and only if
Proa ({a ∈ a : X (a, θ) ⊆ S}) ≤ Prox|θ (S) ∀S ∈ Wx, θ ∈ θ .
The proof for the sufficiency part of the lemma starts by noting that if a ∈ A, then
θ ∈ (a, x) implies θ ∈ ⋃
a′∈A

(
a′, x
)
∀θ ∈ θ, x ∈ x.
Phrased in terms of sets,
A ⊆
⎧⎨
⎩a ∈ a : {x ∈ x : θ ∈ (a, x)} ⊆
⎧⎨
⎩x ∈ x : θ ∈
⋃
a′∈A

(
a′, x
)⎫⎬
⎭
⎫⎬
⎭ ,
or equivalently
A ⊆
⎧⎨
⎩a ∈ a : X (a, θ) ⊆
⎧⎨
⎩x ∈ x : θ ∈
⋃
a′∈A

(
a′, x
)⎫⎬
⎭
⎫⎬
⎭ .
Drawing upon the third well-posedness condition, we now have
Proa (A) ≤ Proa
⎛
⎝
⎧⎨
⎩a ∈ a : X (a, θ) ⊆
⎧⎨
⎩x ∈ x : θ ∈
⋃
a′∈A

(
a′, x
)⎫⎬
⎭
⎫⎬
⎭
⎞
⎠ .
Therefore,
Proa ({a ∈ a : X (a, θ) ⊆ S}) ≤ Prox|θ (S) ∀S ∈ Wx, θ ∈ θ
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implies
Proa
⎛
⎝
⎧⎨
⎩a ∈ a : X (a, θ) ⊆
⎧⎨
⎩x ∈ x : θ ∈
⋃
a′∈A

(
a′, x
)⎫⎬
⎭
⎫⎬
⎭
⎞
⎠ ≤ Prox|θ
⎛
⎝
⎧⎨
⎩x ∈ x : θ ∈
⋃
a∈A
(a, x)
⎫⎬
⎭
⎞
⎠
∀A ∈ Ba, θ ∈ θ,
which further implies
Proa (A) ≤ Prox|θ
⎛
⎝
⎧⎨
⎩x ∈ x : θ ∈
⋃
a∈A
(a, x)
⎫⎬
⎭
⎞
⎠ ∀A ∈ Ba, θ ∈ θ .
The proof for the necessity component of the lemma begins with the fact that, given S ∈ Wx and θ ∈ θ , for any x ∈ x ,
the existence of a ∈ a such that X (a, θ) ⊆ S and θ ∈ (a, x) implies that x ∈ S. Re-writing this fact as a set relation, we
have {
x ∈ x : θ ∈
⋃ {(a, x) : a ∈ a, X (a, θ) ⊆ S}} ⊆ S ∀S ∈ Wx, θ ∈ θ,
which implies
Prox|θ
({
x ∈ x : θ ∈
⋃ {(a, x) : a ∈ a, X (a, θ) ⊆ S}}) ≤ Prox|θ (S) ∀S ∈ Wx, θ ∈ θ .
So,
Proa (A) ≤ Prox|θ
⎛
⎝
⎧⎨
⎩x ∈ x : θ ∈
⋃
a∈A
(a, x)
⎫⎬
⎭
⎞
⎠ ∀A ∈ Ba, θ ∈ θ
implies
Proa ({a ∈ a : X (a, θ) ⊆ S}) ≤ Prox|θ
({
x ∈ x : θ ∈
⋃ {(a, x) : a ∈ a, X (a, θ) ⊆ S}})
∀S ∈ Wx, θ ∈ θ,
which further implies
Proa ({a ∈ a : X (a, θ) ⊆ S}) ≤ Prox (S) ∀S ∈ Wx, θ ∈ θ .
Thus, the Confidence-Mapping Lemma is valid so long as the well-posedness conditions defined in Section 2 are satisfied.
Applying this lemma to prove the validity of pivot-based confidence structures is a relatively simple matter. Let θ , x, and
a be the parameter, observable, and auxiliary random seed-variable as defined in Section 2. Let T (x, θ) be a pivot. Define a
so that it has the same domain and probability distribution as T . The pivot-based confidence structure for θ using a as its
auxiliary random seed-variable will be defined by the following map:
(a, x) = {θ ∈ θ : a = T (x, θ)} .
The induced parameter conditional random set on X will be defined via the following map:
X (a, θ) = {x ∈ x : a = T (x, θ)} .
By the Confidence-Mapping Lemma, it is sufficient to show that
Proa ({a ∈ a : X (a, θ) ⊆ S}) ≤ Prox|θ (S) ∀S ∈ Wx, θ ∈ θ
in order to show that the defined confidence structure is valid. For the pivot-based confidence structure,
Proa (A) = Prox|θ ({x ∈ x : T (x, θ) ∈ A}) ∀θ ∈ θ, A ∈ Ba
because awas defined to have the same probability distribution as T . If A = {a ∈ a : X (a, θ) ⊆ S} for some S ∈ Wx , then
T (x, θ) ∈ A ↔ X (T (x, θ) , θ) ⊆ S ↔ x′ ∈ S ∀x′ s.t. T (x, θ) = T
(
x′, θ
)
→ x ∈ S.
Phrased in terms of probabilities, this logic yields
Proa ({a ∈ a : X (a, θ) ⊆ S}) = Prox|θ ({x ∈ x : T (x, θ) ∈ {a ∈ a : X (a, θ) ⊆ S}}) ≤ Prox|θ (S) .
Thus, by the Confidence-Mapping Lemma, pivots must yield valid confidence structures. Moreover, while most previous
work with pivot-based confidence distributions has focused on inference on single real-valued parameters [6,7], the proof
presented here is valid for any statistical inference problem for which a pivot can be defined.
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For example, consider the problem of inferring both the mean and standard deviation of a normal population based on
n iid samples from that population. Two stochastically independent pivots are known to exist for this problem,
z = μ − x¯
σ/
√
n
and ψ = s
2
x
σ 2
(n − 1) ,
where z has a unit normal distribution and ψ has a χ2 distribution with n − 1 degrees of freedom [11, Chap. 5]. Defining
θ = (μ, σ ), the pivot-based confidence distribution for this problem will have the following formulation:
(a, x) =
⎛
⎝x¯ − a1√
a2
sx
√
1 − 1
n
, sx
√
n − 1
a2
⎞
⎠ ,
where a = (a1, a2), a1 has a unit normal distribution, a2 has a χ2 distribution with n− 1 degrees of freedom, and where a1
and a2 are stochastically independent. It is the power of the Confidence-Mapping Lemma and the related ability to construct
confidence structures in general spaces that makes the formalism established in Section 2 preferable to the cumulative
confidence formalism used in previous work [6,7].
5. Propagating confidence structures
Anotheruseful applicationof theConfidence-MappingLemma is inproving that independent confidence structures canbe
propagated using a Cartesian product formula. That is to say, suppose θ1 and θ2 are inferentially uncertain and represented by
independent confidence structures; suppose q is equal to some function of θ1 and θ2; in this situation, onemay propagate the
confidence structures on θ1 and θ2 to yield a valid confidence structure on q. (Independence between confidence structures
is not determined by dependence between the inferentially uncertain quantities, θ1 and θ2, themselves; they are fixed
unknown constants. Two confidence structures are independent if the observables, x1 and x2, on which they are based are
stochastically independent.) The fact that confidence structures can be propagated is one of their most important (and it
seems, to date, unrecognized) properties.
Confidence structures can be propagated using the same tools used to propagate any random set. Propagating multiple
independent random sets is best thought of as a two-part process. The first part is to build a joint structure on the inputs,
and the second part is to map that joint structure from the input space to the output space. That is, suppose y1 and y2
are represented using random sets with maps Y1 and Y2 and auxiliary random seed variables a1 and a2, respectively. Let
z = g (y1, y2)where g is some function of y1 and y2. The first part of the propagation process is to define a random set on the
joint input, y = (y1, y2). The Cartesian product formula is one way of constructing this joint structure, and it is appropriate
when the random sets on y1 and y2 are independent. Using the notation of this paper, the Cartesian product is the following
random set on Y:
Y (a) = Y1 (a1) × Y2 (a2) , (6)
where a = (a1, a2) and the probability distribution of a is derived from the marginal distributions of a1 and a2 by treating
them as stochastically independent. The Cartesian product operator in this formula, ×, is defined as follows:
A × B = {(a, b) : a ∈ A, b ∈ B} .
Once the joint structure has been defined, uncertainty in z based on y1 and y2 can be represented by a random set written
in terms of a whose map, Z , is as follows:
Z (a) = {g (y1, y2) : (y1, y2) ∈ Y (a)} . (7)
The Cartesian product formula for random sets generalizes the propagation of independent random variables. (In the case of
randomvariables, it is typical to rewrite the expression of z in terms of an auxiliary seedwhose dimensionality is equal to that
of z. That is to say, it would make little sense to keep a single real-valued variable expressed in terms of a two-dimensional
auxiliary vector. However, reducing the results when non-distributional types of random sets are propagated is not always
a simple process [3, Chap. 7].) Also, since no restriction is placed on the type of spaces to which y1 and y2 belong, this
formulation can be extended, by induction, to any finite number of input variables.
Using confidence structures, many of the classically difficult problems of frequentist statistical inference can be reduced
to a matter of straightforward uncertainty propagation. Consider the Fisher–Behrens problem. The Fisher–Behrens problem
is to determine the difference in the mean of two normal populations, given no assumption about the variances of those
two populations. That is, suppose x1 is an iid sample of size n1 from a normal population with unknownμ1 and σ1 and that
x2 is an iid sample of size n2 from a normal population with unknown μ2 and σ2; the problem is to design a test for the
hypothesis,μ1 = μ2, or more generally to construct a rational belief function on the difference,μ2 −μ1. As an illustration
of the power of his proposed theory of fiducial inference, Fisher took the direct approach to solving this problem. To obtain
a fiducial distribution onμ2 −μ1, he took the difference of the two fiducial distributions onμ2 andμ1. These distributions
were calculated as follows:
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Fig. 7. Numerical Result for Fisher–Behrens Problem for Example Data. Monte-Carlo Approximation in Black. Williamson-Downs Bounds in Gray.
μ2 = x¯2 + s2tn2−1 and μ1 = x¯1 + s1t′n1−1,
where x¯1 and x¯2 are the samplemeans of x1 and x2; s1 and s2 are their sample standard deviations; and the variables t and t
′
are independent t-distributedvariableswith the appropriate degrees of freedom[18]. As explored in Section3.1, these shifted
and rescaled t-distributions also enjoy a confidence-mapping interpretation. The general claim that confidence structures
can be propagated implies the more specific claim that confidence distributions can be propagated. Given the validity of
this claim, Fisher’s solution to the Fisher–Behrens problem can be rationalized on completely classical (i.e., Neymanian)
frequentist grounds.
Fig. 7 illustrates two numerical approximations of Fisher’s solution to the Fisher–Behrens problem. Two approximations
for the confidence distributions onμ1 andμ2 are illustrated in Panel A and Panel B for a given realization of x1 and x2. In gray
is the map of a discrete Dempster–Shafer structure that conservatively captures the true t-distribution. The transformation
on which this Dempster–Shafer structure is based was first suggested byWilliamson and Downs [19]. The black dashed line
in each panel represents the empirical CDF of a Monte-Carlo sample drawn from said t-distribution. To obtain a confidence
structure on the difference between the two means, one simply propagates the conservative Dempster–Shafer structures
in Panels A and B from μ1 and μ2 to the difference, μ2 − μ1. The propagation is achieved using the Cartesian product
method described in Section 2.2. (The output is then rearranged conservatively into a visually sensible form using certain
transformations between p-boxes and Dempster–Shafer structures [20].) The map of the resulting confidence structure is
illustrated in gray in Panel C of Fig. 7. Alternatively, the result obtained using independent Monte-Carlo sampling onμ1 and
μ2 is illustrated with a dashed black line. Given that the size of the sample used was one million, the dashed line should
provide a close approximation to the true underlying confidence distribution for μ2 − μ1 that would have been obtained
by propagating the exact confidence distributions for μ1 and μ2. So, the total effect of Panel Three of Fig. 7 is both a close
approximation of the confidence distribution for μ2 − μ1 in black and a set of sure bounds on said distribution in gray.
This kind of direct approach to a compound inference problem is taken for granted in the Bayesian formalism; but,
as mentioned in the introduction, Bayesian measures of belief do not meet the same standards of empirical rigor that is
demanded in many problems within engineering and applied science. Fisher offered a justification in terms of fiducial
inference, but fiducial probability is socially defunct in the statistics community today [4, Chap. 8] [21]. Therefore, it is no
small thing to claim the ability to justify the quantification and propagation of inferential uncertainty on frequentist grounds.
Given the Confidence-Mapping Lemma, it is reasonably easy to prove the validity of the Cartesian product as amethod for
propagating independent confidence structures. Suppose confidence structuresRθ1,a|x1 andRθ2,a|x2 onunknownparameters
θ1 and θ2 are based on stochastically independent observed random variables x1 and x2. Taking the Cartesian product of
these two confidence structures is equivalent to defining on θ = (θ1, θ2) a random set,Rθ,a|x , with the following map:
(a, x) = 1 (a1, x1) × 2 (a2, x2) ,
where a = (a1, a2) and x = (x1, x2).  induces the following auxiliary formulation on x:
X (a, θ) = {x ∈ x1 × x2 : θ ∈ (a, x)} = X1 (a1, θ1) × X2 (a2, θ2) ,
where
X1 (a1, θ1) = {x1 ∈ x1 : θ1 ∈ 1 (a1, x1)} and X2 (a2, θ2) = {x2 ∈ x2 : θ2 ∈ 2 (a2, x2)} .
By the Confidence-Mapping Lemma, the maps X1 and X2 must support belief functions that are conservative with respect
to the true underlying probability distributions on x1 and x2. As discussed in Section 2.2, the Cartesian product of X1 and X2
will support a belief function on x1 × x2 that is conservative with respect to the joint probability function obtained by
assuming that x1 and x2 are stochastically independent. Written mathematically, X has the following property:
Proa
({
a ∈ a1 × a2 : X (a, θ) ⊆ S
}) ≤ Prox|θ (S) ∀S ∈ Wx1 ×Wx2 , θ ∈ θ1 × θ2 .
Again, by the Confidence-Mapping Lemma, the above relationship implies that generated via the Cartesian product must
support a valid confidence structure on (θ1, θ2).
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The Confidence-Mapping Lemma also shows that propagating this joint confidence structure on a set of inputs will yield
a valid confidence structure on the output. Suppose z = g (θ1, θ2)where g is some deterministic function. The observation-
conditional random set on z defined by Eq. (7) will have the following map:
Z (a, x) = {g (θ1, θ2) : (θ1, θ2) ∈ (a, x)} .
Defining
g−1 (z) = {(θ1, θ2) : z = g (θ1, θ2)} ,
the induced parameter-conditional random set for x based on the random set for z will be as follows:
X′ (a, z) = ⋃
θ∈g−1(z)
X (a, θ).
So, for a given value of θ ,
X′ (a, g (θ)) ⊇ X (a, θ) ∀a ∈ a,
which leads to
Belx|g(θ) (S) ≤ Belx|θ (S) ∀S ∈ Wx;
that is, the parameter-conditional random set on x induced by g (θ) will be conservative with respect to that induced by θ ,
which, as has already been established, is conservative with respect to the probability distribution of x. Therefore, by the
Confidence-Mapping Lemma, the propagated confidence structure on z must be valid.
6. The non-uniqueness difficulty
Confidence structures suffer onenoteworthy limitation: they arenon-unique. This deficiencyhas alreadybeen recognized
within themore restricted theory of confidence distributions. For example, suppose the variancewere known in the normal-
sampling problem described in Section 3.1. Using this knowledge, one could define a confidence distribution forμ using the
following map function:
M (a, x) = x¯ + σ√
n
F−1nrm (a) ,
where the auxiliary randomseed-variable, a, is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and F−1nrm is the inverse cumulative distribution
function for a normal distributionwith zeromean and unit variance. However, the confidence distribution defined using the
t-distribution would also still be valid. Singh et al. make a convincing case for the superiority of the confidence distribution
that uses knowledge of the variance; their argument is based on an intuitive definition for precision that has not yet been
generalized to confidence structures [7].
The mathematical liberality of the theory of confidence structures exacerbates the non-uniqueness problem. For some
problems, it is possible to define confidence structures that have disparate mathematical origins. Consider the binomial
inference problem addressed in Section 3.2. The approach explored in that section was called “pivoting the distribution”.
However, the p-value basedmethod exposited in Section 3.3 could also be applied to the binomial inference problem. Panels
A and B of Fig. 8 show respectively the pivot-based and p-value-based confidence structures for the binomial inference
problem when four successes were observed in seven independent trials. (The p-values used to construct the map in Panel
B were based on a likelihood ratio test-statistic,
Fig. 8. Contradictory but valid confidence structures for the binomial inference problem with n = 7 and k = 4.
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T (k, θ) =
(
θ
k/n
)k (
1 − θ
1 − k/n
)n−k
.
For this test-statistic, larger values of T (k, θ) were considered favorable to the hypothesis that the underlying probability
was equal to θ given k.) Neither of the confidence structures illustrated in Fig. 8 is conservativewith respect to the other; they
are simply different. The confidence structure in Panel A looks more distribution-like, perhaps more intuitively appealing.
However, the confidence structure in Panel B is more centrally focused. For example, the confidence structure in Panel B
assigns a belief value of 0.27 to the proposition “θ ∈ [0.5, 0.65]”, which would seem like a reasonable proposition, given
the realized success rate, 4/7 = 0.571. In contrast, the confidence structure in Panel A only assigns a belief value of 0.032
to the proposition that “θ ∈ [0.5, 0.65]”; this level of belief may seem unreasonably small given the realized success rate.
The point here is that neither confidence structure can claim superiority in any obvious way. Both support a confidence
interpretation. Both have strengths and weaknesses in terms of intuitive appeal. It seems likely that neither is truly optimal.
The requirement that inferential belief be represented in terms of Neyman–Pearson confidence is not enough to define a
uniquemethodof inference. The key to defining auniqueoptimal confidence structuremaybe in extending Singh’s definition
of precision to all confidence structures. Another possible approach is to constrain confidence structures by requiring that
inference satisfy other properties, like the sufficiency principle. Alternatively, it may be reasonable to ask whether inference
must always be optimal. For many problems, a meaningful and holistic representation of inferential uncertainty may be
adequate, even if it is not optimal. Accordingly, the question of optimal inference is left to futurework. For now, practitioners
will have to rely on professional judgment and common sense to choose among the valid confidence structures that exist
for a given problem.
7. Comparison and contrast with other inference methods
Before closing, itmakes some sense to remark on the place of confidence structureswithin existing traditions of statistical
inference. Confidence structures are neither entirely Bayesian nor entirely frequentist in nature. Its centralmeasure of belief,
Neyman–Pearson confidence, is a frequentist concept. However, the goal achieved in the theory of confidence structures, to
define a rationally induced belief function, is the goal of Bayesian inference. This is the advance that confidence structures
represent: bringing together those two aspects of the Bayesian and frequentist formalisms. For readers interested in learning
more about the frequentist-Bayesian duality, there are a number of texts that address the topic of comparative statistical
inference [2,4,12,22].
Confidence structures are perhaps most correctly categorized as belonging to the less well-known tradition of fiducial
inference. Confidence distributions have been closely tied to Fisher’s fiducial distributions [6] [5, Chap. 5]. Moreover, the
other parent-theory of confidence-structures, Dempster–Shafer evidence theory, originated with Dempster’s attempts to
rationalize Fisher’s fiducial inference [14]. In fact, the formalism used in this paper is largely inspired by a recent paper
from Dempster expositing his vision of Dempster–Shafer theory [10]. In that paper, Dempster renews the ties between
Dempster–Shafer theory and Fisher’s fiducial inference [10].
The relationship betweenDempster’smethod and confidence structures goes beyond their common intellectual heritage.
Dempster’smethod [10], Kohlas’ theoryofhints [23, Chap. 9], andFraser’s structural inference [24] areall basedona structural
statisticalmodel. That is, the observable randomvariable is written as a function of a auxiliary seed randomvariable, a, (with
known probability distribution) and the parameter being inferred, θ . That is, the structural model is
x = X (a, θ) such that Proa ({a ∈ a : X (a, θ) ∈ S}) = Prox|θ (S) ∀θ ∈ θ, S ∈ Bx.
In these approaches to inference, given an observed value of x, the belief function is calculated as follows:
Belθ |x (B) = Proa ({a ∈ R (x) : (a, x) ⊆ B})
Proa (R (x))
,
where
(a, x) = {θ ∈ θ : X (a, θ) = x} and R (x) = {a ∈ a : ∃θ s.t. X (a, θ) = x} .
This measure of belief, termed “lower fiducial probability”, has a (potential) frequentist interpretation of its own, different
from Neyman–Pearson confidence. It is the probability of having drawn seed a such that x and a imply θ ∈ B, given the
observed x [23, Chap. 9]. However, this frequentist interpretation has not gained widespread acceptance, perhaps because
Dempster himself has insisted on adhering to a “logicist” view of probability [25]. On the other hand, Fraser has been
consistent in promulgating this frequentist interpretation for his own similar (if not equivalent) inferential process [24]. In
any event, these approaches to fiducial inference, like the theory of confidence structures, can be seen as attempts at fusing
empirical rigor of frequentist inference with the comprehensive nature of Bayesian inference.
The Confidence Mapping Lemma only deepens the connection between confidence structures and Dempster’s method.
Specifically, it implies that if
R (x) = a ∀x ∈ x,
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then a and, as defined in the previous paragraph, will serve as the seed andmap for a confidence structure on θ . This is not
the only time that Dempster’s method will lead to a confidence structure. For example, the result obtained when applying
Dempster’s method to the problem of binomial inference [26] is identical to the pivot-based confidence structure obtained
in Section 3.2 of this paper.
While the fact that Dempster’s method can yield confidence structures is far from coincidental, Dempster–Shafer theory
and the theory of confidence structures are not identical and will not always yield compatible results. For example, there
is no structural model for binomial inference from which Dempster’s method will yield the consonant structure obtained
in Section 6. Moreover, the conditionalization involved in Dempster’s method implies that inferences it obtains will be
unaffected by experimental stopping rules. In contrast, confidence structures, like any method based on Neyman–Pearson
confidence [2], may be affected by the stopping rules of an experiment. Therefore, neither Dempster–Shafer theory nor
the theory of confidence structures constitutes a special case of the other. They are two theories of fiducial inference with
substantial partial overlap, the full nature and extent of which will have to be the subject of future study.
There are a few other approaches to fusing Bayesian comprehensiveness and frequentist rigor which may interest the
reader. For example, there has been recent work based on weakening the results of a Dempster–Shafer analysis, not to
bring belief into accord with a frequentist definition, but rather to bring it in accord to certain frequentist decision-making
properties regarding a hypothesis of interest and its negation; thismethodology goes by the term “weak belief” [27].Walley’s
paper on trying to satisfy both frequentist and likelihood principles [28] may also be of interest to the reader. One of the
approaches Walley discusses is to perform Bayesian analysis on set of possible priors and to define that set of priors such
that credible intervals will also be confidence intervals [28]. In combination with the p-box to Dempster–Shafer structure
transformation [20], this could constitute another method for defining confidence structures. However, users may find the
results unnecessarily conservative. It should be noted, though, that within the theory of confidence structures, satisfying
the likelihood principle is, at most, a secondary goal. Confidence structures are meant to capture the information-richness
and propagatability of Bayesian posteriors; the likelihood principle is, in principle, of little interest.
8. Conclusions
The theory of confidence structures provides a new way to represent inferential uncertainty. Confidence structures
represent uncertainty in a holistic fashion and can be propagated as part of larger uncertainty analyses. Just as importantly,
confidence structures support an empirically rigorous interpretation. This theory fuses the best aspects of both Bayesian
inference and classical frequentist inference, and it should prove useful to a wide variety of analysts working in the field.
Muchwork concerning confidence structuresnevertheless remains tobedone. This paperhasonly established thevalidity
of propagating (1) joint confidence structures and (2) mutually independent marginal confidence structures. A topic of
practical interest to uncertainty quantifierswill be the propagation of confidence structureswhose dependence is unknown.
Furthermore, the review of methods for constructing confidence structures given in this paper is not exhaustive or exclusive
in any way. There are almost certainly many more useful and intuitive methods for constructing confidence structures that
await exploration. Some of thesemethodsmay arise fromefforts to better understand the relationship between the theory of
confidence structures andDempster’s inferential calculus [10]. Perhapsmost importantly, a resolution to thenon-uniqueness
problem is desired. For now, practical work with confidence structures can progress using common sense, good faith, and
professional judgment as themeans bywhich to restrain the choice of confidence structure in real-world problems.However,
the theory will remain palpably incomplete until the non-uniqueness problem is resolved.
Though part of the fiducial tradition, confidence structures cannot be considered a complete resolution to the question of
fiducial inference. The promise of fiducial inference is the promise of a unique normative inferential belief function [18]. The
requirement that belief be commensurate with Neyman–Pearson confidence is simply not sufficient to uniquely determine
an inferential belief function. Nevertheless, this is not sufficient reason to despair of ever solving the problem of fiducial
inference. As discussed in Section 7, a number of promising alternative theories exist. While these theories undergo further
development and interpretation, the theory of confidence structures stands ready as a useful transitional theory, enabling
meaningful solutions to today’s problems of statistical inference in applied science and engineering.
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